Review Sheet One
POLI/INTL 361
Summer 2024
This is a take home exam.
Basic Requirements
·
Feel free to email me questions if you have them, but as usual,
there are limits to how I can help you
The exam has two parts:
And,
important:
·
Sharing
this exam with anyone outside the class is a violation of the VCU Honor Code
·
Working
with another student in the class or anyone else while you take this exam is a
violation of the VCU Honor Code
·
As
with any take home, the plagiarism
rules that exist for research papers apply here. Your exams must be your written work. I will
run this through the standard plagiarism programs as I do with all research
papers.
This review looks big, but
don't worry. If you have come to class
and done all the reading, nothing here should be new to you. Also, though there are a lot of terms, obviously,
not each one of them is the subject of an essay. These terms, in order, form an
outline of everything we've done so far. A group of them might be the subject
of an essay. Usually, you can't explain a single term without referring to the
terms next to it. So, really, if you can say one or two things about each term
and how it relates to the terms around it and fits into the larger scheme of
nuclear weapons you're doing fine. Some terms, however, are filled with enough
significance to be short answers/identifications on the test, but you'll be
able to figure out which ones.
Terms with (*) in front of
them may not have been included in the lectures, but were discussed, at length,
in the readings.
List of Terms
Functions
of Force (or why
do nations have weapons anyway?)
To achieve political goals
1.
Defense
2.
Deterrence
o
*Goal
o
*Method
o
*Assumption
of rationality
§
influencing
an opponent’s decision process
§
Rational
choice/cost-benefit analysis
o
*Credibility
of threat
o
communicating
the threat
§
capability
and will
o
Two
types of deterrence
§
deterrence
by denial
§
deterrence
by punishment
o
*Extended
deterrence
o
Complications
§
Bounded
Rationality
§
Irrationality?
§
*If
deterrence fails?
3.
Compellence
a.
Goal
b.
Brute
Force?
c.
Assumption
of rationality
d.
Compellence
is bargaining
e.
Entering
the bargaining
4.
Swaggering
First
Nuclear Age
General Characteristics
1.
Bipolarity
2.
Rationality
3.
Balance of Power
4.
Deterrence
5.
Arms Control
Conventional vs. nuclear
Atomic Bombs/Fission/A-Bombs
Manhattan Project
US arms race with Germany
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Radioactive Fallout
Nuclear Bomb/Thermonuclear
Bomb/Hydrogen Bomb/Fusion Bomb/H-Bomb
Nuclear Triad
1.
Strategic
Bombers
a.
B-52
b.
ALCMs
2.
ICBMs
a.
Advantages
of ICBM over bombers
b.
Silos
c.
Minuteman
III
d.
MIRVs
3.
SLBMs
a.
Advantages
of SLBMs
b.
”
invulnerability” of subs
4.
Why
create a Triad?
a.
*Deterrence
b.
Increasing
the probability that one leg will survive a first strike by the opponent
c.
*First
strike
d.
*Second
strike
e.
*Counterforce
targeting
Effects of nuclear war
Nuclear
Strategy
*Bernard Brodie. The Absolute Weapon (book,
1946)
*Nuclear revolution/existential
deterrence
*Wohlstetter argument: creating a
credible deterrent is difficult
*Lieber and Press
*Key
question on nuclear weapons: if there was a nuclear revolution, why do nations
still compete? why do they have arms races? why have they developed strategies
for fighting a nuclear war?
*Nuclear
weapons have not ended geopolitical competition
*Maintaining
a deterrent is difficult
*Credible
second-strike capability is difficult to achieve
*Creating
nuclear stalemate: no one can win a nuclear war, even winners
*The
debate on nuclear stalemate:
*Is it easy?
*Is it irreversible
*Does it deter conventional war?
*Massive Retaliation: 1950s nuclear
strategy
*Nuclear weapons as first line of
deterrence
*To deter any Soviet behavior US
doesn’t like
A bluff?
*Warfighting: counterforce
targeting
*Criticism of Massive Retaliation
*Limited Nuclear war
*Ending a nuclear war (war
termination)
*Countervalue vs. Counterforce
targeting
*Flexible Response
*Continued search for nuclear war
options
*Assured Destruction
*Deterrence = Second strike
capability
*Minimum deterrent
*The
problem of making nuclear war less devastating – increases the probability of
having a nuclear war
*Survivable
weapons: the strategies for survivability (Lieber and Press)
*SLBMs
*ICBM
vulnerability
*Damage
Limitation and ABMs
Arms
Control
Thousands of weapons but we don’t
want to fight a nuclear war
Deterrence, but the security
dilemma
Arms Races
action-reaction phenomenon
Secretary of defense Robert
McNamara
Arms Control goals
managing the competition
By 1960s: Two Arms Races
offense-offense
offense-defense
ABMs
The impact of ABMs or missile defense
on deterrence
how does it impact a second strike?
scenario for victory
the advantage of going first
Crisis stability
SALT 1972
Interim Agreement
launcher limits
essential equivalence
ABM Treaty
Ban on nationwide ABMs
Research allowed
Two test sites
National Technical Means of
verification
Criticisms of SALT
End of the Cold War
START
Real reductions
Second
Nuclear Age
First vs. Second Nuclear Age Big
Picture Comparison
1.
Multipolarity
2.
Rationality?
3.
Asymmetry
4.
Deterrence
a.
BMD
5.
Arms Control
a.
Stability
b.
Non-Proliferation
*Narang
and Sagan: Basics
*With
new nations, will classic deterrence hold?
*The
problem of regional rivalries
*Talmadge
in Narang and Sagan
*Is
multipolar deterrence different? (Talmadge)
*Deterrence
in cold war: aligned with US and USSR
*Now
multi-sided
*Confidence
in 2nd strike against multiple opponents?
*Narang
and Williams in Narang and Sagan
*Twitter as a factor in crisis
communications
*Four ways social media can impact
nuclear crises
*Zegart
in Narang and Sagan
*Public Technical Means (definition)
*Five risks
*Lewis
and Panda in Narang and Sagan
*The concept of “enoughness”
*Enough for what?
*Clary
in Narang and Sagan
*New counterforce
*Six responses to counterforce
*Arceneaux
and Feaver
*Command and control definition
*Types
of control
*Variations in the way nations
control their weapons (no need to know each nation, just that they differ)
*Bell
and Miller in Narang and Sagan
*Can states learn?
*Their definition of learning
*The difficulty of learning
US, Russia, China
US and Russia
What’s
the same?
What’s
different?
US strategy
Who
the US deters?
Better
warfighting capability
Modernization
of the Triad
Arms
Control with Russia
New
START
The
Big Change: National Missile Defense
Deterrence
by Denial
Russia
Loss
of empire: tragedy
Using
nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority
Ending
No First Use Policy
Escalate
to De-escalate
National
Missile Defense
Renewing
New START
Then
suspension of New START by Russia after Russia invasion of Ukraine
China
Return
to Great Power Status
Sino-Soviet
Split
China’s
First Bomb
Minimum
Deterrence
NFU
Create
a Triad
China’s
view of US NMD
it is aimed at China, not North
Korea
Requires China to build its arsenal
No arms control
Offense-defense arms race
Cyberattack to compensate for
inferiority
Non-Proliferation
Basics
Who has nuclear weapons?
“Nth Country Problem”
Nuclear haves’ decision: only we
can have these weapons
winners
of WW II
Perm
5 of UN Security Council
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Two Types of States
Nuclear
weapons states and their responsibilities
Non-nuclear weapons states and
their responsibilities
Nuclear Energy
Reactors can be used to develop a
weapon
IAEA
Verification of treaty options
Safeguards
Agreements with IAEA
Uranium enrichment (beyond energy
reactor needs)
Problems
Those who never signed
Israel
case: secretive program ignored by its allies (US, UK, France)
Those who violated the treaty
Options for what can be done to end
proliferation
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
The
Problem of Proliferation (in
India-Pakistan PPT and Lecture)
Three Questions
1.
Why
does a nation decide it wants nuclear weapons?
a.
Deterrence
and assured retaliation
b.
Demonstrate
power (swaggering)
c.
To
bargain (compellence)
d.
asymmetric
escalation – compensating for weakness
e.
catalytic
– to ring in a third power
2.
What
can be done about it?
3.
Does
it matter? Is that just decided by
politics?
India
and Pakistan
Did not sign the NPT
Non-proliferation failure
Partition, Rivalry, War
(You don’t need to know all the
details; just that the two nations were born into rivalry)
Kashmir Division as a source of
conflict
1960s shifts in balance of power
Sino-Indian War 1962
1964 Chinese A-bomb
China allies with Pakistan in two
wars
1965 India v. Pakistan
1971 Indian v. Pakistan
US
sides with Pakistan
1968 NPT: “Atomic Collusion”
1974 Smiling Buddha test (Pokhran
I)
Pakistan accelerates its program
after 1971 loss to India
Chinese help
AQ Khan
Compensating for India conventional
superiority
“Turn of a Screw Programs”
May 1998 Indian tests
May 1998 Pakistani tests
Indian Nuclear Doctrine
Triad
NFU
Minimum Deterrence
Deterring Pakistan and China
The
Triad so far?
US-India nuclear cooperation
Pakistani Nuclear Strategy
Triad?
No NFU
Minimum deterrence
Deterrence of nuclear and
conventional war (compensation for inferiority)
Battlefield use during conventional war
The “Triad” so far?
The three questions in the context
of India and Pakistan
Outliers
South Africa: Dismantling a program out of
racism and pressure from allies
Taiwan: Dismantling a program as allies
pressure them to end the program
Geopolitical
changes
US
opening to mainland China
Israel
Did not sign NPT
May have had capability in early to
mid-1960s
Refuses to state whether it has
nuclear weapons
Strategy: Deterrence of rivals in
the region
Regional Triad
Ability to hit all its rivals in
the region
Faces no sanctions from US and allies
because it is an ally of the US
Iraq
and Iran
Signed the NPT and violated it
Rivalries in the neighborhood
Iraq:
The use of force
Iraq’s strategy
deterrence
of regional rival and global rivals
involved
in an arms race
demonstrating
power
regime
survival
Saddam Hussein determination to
build a nuclear weapon
Iran-Iraq War
June 1981: Osiraq Reactor: Israel’s
form of non-proliferation
1990-91 War
Iraqi surrender agreement
Disarmament
IAEA inspections
Iraq doesn’t always cooperate
Operation Desert Fox
Aftermath
Iraq’s nuclear program destroyed,
but no one knew that outside of Iraq
Saddam Hussein’s efforts to
convince the world it was still close to nuclear weapons
to
deter the US
Lies told to Saddam Hussein
Post-9/11
GW Bush administration targeted
Iraq
Belief that Iraq has nuclear
weapons and will use them
Undeterrable
Irrational
March 2003: Regime Change
Iran:
Sanctions, Negotiations, and Force
Iranian strategy
Deterrence of neighbors
Asymmetric escalation
Regional power
Arms race
US overthrow of Iranian government
1953
Iranian Revolution
US hostages
Support for terrorism: Hezbollah
Beirut
1983
Decision and Detection
HEU
E3 Negotiations
UNSC Sanctions
P5+1
The deal
Stuxnet/Olympic Games
JCPOA
US withdrawal from JCPOA
New Sanctions
12 Demands
Iranian response
Choices
Deal
that delinks nuclear weapons from other Iranian foreign policy issues
OR
Comprehensive
change in Iranian foreign policy
*the problem of deterring
personalistic regimes (McDermott in Narang and Sagan)
North Korea
Korea at the intersection of great
power interests
Division of Korean Peninsula
Korean War
Cold War politics
Belief in reunification
The nature of the regimes
North Korean: Hermit Kingdom
Family-rules
Communist regime
Kim
Jong-un
South Korea: Authoritarian
Capitalist, then democracy in 1980s
Why would North Korea build a bomb
•
Regime Survival
• Demonstration of Power
•
Deterrence of Rivals
•
ROK, Japan, US
• Asymmetric Escalation
•
Catalytic
Desire for US recognition as a path
to survival
The North Korean nightmare
Why they began in the 1970s
The South Korean program:
motivation and end of program
The tactical maneuver
North Korea has goals: nothing to
bargain with except threat
*Agreed Framework: The Deal: 1994
Six Party Talks
*North Korea detonates a bomb
Hwasong 14: ICBM that can hit the
US (Date of first test)
Ability to threaten US directly
ROK response
THAAD
Japan response
China response
US: Trump policy: “Maximum
Pressure” “Fire and Fury”
Then Concessions
Singapore and Hanoi Summits
Singapore Agreement:
Denuclearization
Compared to JCPOA
North Korean Dyad
North Korean strategy (2013 Law)
Deterrence
Retaliation
NFU that really isn’t NFU
Has North Korea ever paid a price
for provocative action?
Can proliferation be stopped?
ROK and Japan next steps
Deterrence