POLI 369 US National Security

Summer 2019

Bill Newmann

Review Sheet One

Some of this is on the Reading Guide.

Terms with (*) in front of them are from the readings. We’ve discussed many of them in class as well, but there is more information from the readings that I expect you to know about those terms.

National Security Decision Making Structure

Pre-1947 Organization

Dept. of State

Dept. of War

Dept. of Navy

The problem of coordination

Pearl Harbor and intelligence coordination problem

What was created by the National Security Act of 1947 (and what had already existed)

Cabinet-style government

Career vs. appointee

State Department role

NS Act of 1947 Changes

1. DoD

· Civilian control (and why do this?)

· Chain of Command

· Combatant Commanders

· Sec. of Defense and Office of the Secretary of Defense

· Dept. of Navy, Army, AF

2. Creation of US Air Force

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Service Rivalry (inter-service rivalry)

“Joint” advice: what does “Joint” mean?

Joint Staff

Role of Chair JCS

4. CIA

Intelligence failures 1998-2003

New DNI role: replaces DCI as the coordinator of Intelligence Community

Congressional Oversight

Models of Decision Making

1. Analytical Model (Rational Actor; Rational Choice)

· Cost-benefit analysis

2. *Organizational Process Model

· standard operating procedure given as advice to presidents

· rivalries between organizations

3. *Bureaucratic Politics Model

· rivalries between officials

· bargaining/compromise leads to decision

4. Presidential Management Model

· managing the process

Interagency Process

The importance of the interagency process

*National Security Council

*Created by National Security Act of 1947

*statutory members and advisors

*Evolution of the NSC Staff

*Premises of presidential management of the national security process

*Models of Presidential Management

1. *Standard Model (its characteristics are described in the Newmann book, but it is not called the standard model)

*Principals Committee

*Deputies Committee

*Assistant Secretary Level (Policy Coordination Committees or Interagency Policy Committees)

*Interagency process paper flow

2. Nixon-Kissinger Style process

*centralization

*role of National Security Adviser

Why centralize?

3. *Crash and Burn: Standard Process with management problems and what we learn from this about the President’s role

*Feuding in Carter administration (who were the main antagonists?)

*Feuding in Reagan administration (who were the main antagonists?)

Trump disarray

4. *Standard Model with Strong Management: GHW Bush (Bush 41)

*Formal process and informal processes

*Gang of Eight

*Breakfast group

*DC role as an insulation

*The Evolution Model

*How decision making changes

*Three Structures

*Formal structure

*Informal Structure

*Confidence Structure

*Why these structures evolve

*The importance of the President he wants from the decision process

The Use of Force

*Why do nation-states use force?

The Four Functions of Force

1. Defense

2. Deterrence

3. Compellence

4. Swaggering

1. Defense

2. *Deterrence

Goal

Method

Assumption of rationality about the target’s decision making process

influencing someone’s intentions and decision making process

Cost-benefit analysis

*Raising the target’s perception of costs and risk

Deterrence by punishment

Deterrence by denial

The importance of communication – communicating the threat and what will force you to take action

Credibility

Capability and will

Extended Deterrence

Examples:

US extended deterrence in Europe

US threats over Taiwan

Obama and threat over Syria’s chemical weapons

Irrationality?

Successful deterrence: how would you know?

If deterrence fails?

3. Compellence (Someone tell Bill Gates that this is how you spell compellence…)

The goal

To stop an opponent from doing something they are doing

To get an opponent to do something they are not doing

Four Basic Elements

A. Is brute force the best option?

a. Pacific War and Cuban Missile Crisis and WW II examples

B. Assumes rationality

C. Compellence is bargaining

a. negotiating through violence

b. Using violence to press your advantage in a negotiated settlement of a political contest

c. Limited War

d. JFK threatening WW II to compel Soviet Union in Cuban Missile Crisis

D. The power to hurt begins the bargaining

a. US demonstrates its power to hurt Japan with atomic bombs

b. Terrorist organizations demonstrate their power to hurt with attacks

i. Now you have to take us seriously; now we can begin a negotiation even if only through violence

Lessons of compellence

a. Compellence doesn’t always work

· Strategic bombing during WW II

· US bombing in Vietnam

· The power to hurt vs. the target’s ability to absorb/endure the pain

b. Democracies are poor at compellence

· Reluctance to inflict great pain

· Reluctance to deal with casualties: Vietnam and Iraq

c. Non-state actors

· Entering the bargaining by demonstrating the power to hurt

· Cold War Era insurgencies

· Post-Cold war era terrorists

d. Irrationality or politics

e. Dilemmas

· perceiving message

· can the opponent do what you ask?

4. Swaggering

Sending a general message: I have power

A demonstration of capability

Teddy Roosevelt sends the US Navy around the globe 1901: The US is powerful!

First Nuclear Age

1. Bipolarity

Spiral theory

action-reaction phenomenon

US and USSR rough equality

Balance of power

Systems

Triad

ICBMs

silos

MIRVs

SLBMs

Bombers

Arms races

Offense-offense

Offense-defense

ABM Systems

2. Deterrence

Strategies of Deterrence: How do you deter?

Warfighting

nuclear weapons as compellence

to threaten the opponent’s capability to fight

deterrence by denial

US strategies of limited nuclear war

If deterrence fails, you have the capability to fight

If deterrence fails, you have the capability to fight a limited war and end a nuclear war

Presidents want more options than surrender or destroy the planet

Assured Destruction

Second strike capability

retaliatory capability = deterrence

survivability

the problem of vulnerability

First strike vs. second strike

deterrence by punishment

MAD

3. Arms Control

what the US and Soviets could agree on: why we had arms control

Management of the arms race and goals of arms control

Cut costs

Increase predictability

Increase transparency

“Essential equivalence”

SALT I: Interim Agreement

SALT I: ABM Treaty

Criticisms

Did it really limit anything?

4. Rationality

strategic stability

Second Nuclear Age

1. *Multipolarity

Asymmetrical relationships

A. Strategic level

US and Russia

Still rough equality

*Russian modernization

US and China

*From Heginbotham et al. China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent

*China modernizing its nuclear weapons

*Doctrine

*No-first use

*Limited deterrent (existential deterrence)

*Assured retaliation (assured destruction)

*Force Structure: Not a Triad

*Land-based missiles

*Submarine-based missiles

*External drivers (know one)

*Internal Drivers (know one)

*Elevation of 2nd Artillery to PLA Rocket Force (equal to Army, Navy, and Air Force)

B. Regional level

India vs. Pakistan

*North Korea:

capability?

how has the US responded to its program?

THAAD

*how US missile defense in East Asia might impact China

*”nested security dilemma” (Heginbotham)

Middle East

Israel

*Iran

US response to Iran:

arms control

compellence

2. Deterrence

New strategies of deterrence to deal with regional threats

Impact on US-Russia relationship

A. Missile Defense

Strategic Defense Initiative

Consensus on National Missile Defense

Deterrence by denial

B. Conventional Prompt Global Strike and why it has been developed

Why develop prompt global strike

3. Arms Control

Strategic

Russia: SORT and New Start: equality

US and China?

Regional

Nuclear Energy

NPT

IAEA

The Problems

Solution: coercion, sanctions, talks

*North Korea

*Six Party talks

Iran: P5+1

Iraq: 2003 invasion

4. *Rationality

*“Undeterrables”

*Does deterrence exist for all states?

Trump NSPM 4

Just read this and get a sense of the NSC, the PC, and DC and what officials are on it.

National Security Strategy of the US, December 2017

America First National Security Policy

“Principled Realism”

Based on the interests of the US people

Competitors

US belief after the Cold War that engagement could tame bad actors – false

Need for US military superiority

Four Pillars (You should able to define each in a few sentences)

1. Protect the Homeland

2. Promote American Prosperity

3. Peace through Strength

4. Advance American Interests

National Defense Strategy 2018

Goals:

· to deter

· if deterrence fails, to fight

· to negotiate from a position of strength

Growing threats

Revisionist Powers (China and Russia)

Weakening of US post-WW II order

Rogue states (Iran, North Korea)

Non-state actors

Primary objective: strategic competition with China and Russia

Nuclear Posture Review. 2018

Growing threat (deterioration of strategic environment)

Growing complexity of threat

Growing complexity of deterrence strategies

Why we have nuclear weapons (should be able to say a few things about each)

· deterrence

· assurance for allies

o extended deterrence

· achieve objectives

· hedging (I’ll explain this; I didn’t think this was explained well)

NC3

Triad

Modernization of Triad

Contemporary Threats

· China

· Russia

· Iran

· North Korea (DPRK)

Missile Defense Review, 2019

Growing threats

Roles of Missile Defense

· protection

· deterrence

· assurance

Defense of US deployments and allies

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI)

THAAD